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Abstract 
This research examines the determinants of firms‟ capital structure introducing a behavioral 
perspective that has received little attention in corporate finance literature. After discussing the 
theoretical linking between firm capital structure choice and the CEO‟s attitude and behavior, we 
are showing on empirical grounds the relationship between the manager‟s behavior toward the 
capital structure preferences and his cognitive commitment level. The article explains that the 
main cause of capital structure choice is CEO commitment level. We introduce an approach based 
on Decision Tree Analysis technique with a series of semi-directive interviews. The originality of 
this research is guaranteed since it traits the behavioral corporate policy choice in emergent 
markets. In the best of knowledge this is the first study in the Tunisian context that explores such 
area of research. Results show that psychological dimension introduced in the capital structure 
analysis has enriched the Pecking Order Theory (POT) and the Static Trade Off Theory (STT) 
CEO (CEO affective commitment) prefer to finance their projects primarily through internal 
capital, by debt in the second hand and finally by equity. 
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1. Introduction 
The main changes recorded in financial theory, including consideration conflicts of interest between agents, 
information asymmetries, the optional nature of financing, asset specificity have significantly closer approach 
theoretical reasoning actually observed in practice. 
Theories of Trade-off (Static Trade-off Theory, STT) and Pecking Order (Pecking Order Theory) are the 
theoretical corpus of reference addressed the issue of the structure financial position of the firm. The first (STT) 
based on a trade-off between costs ( explicit or implicit bankruptcy) and gains (values tax savings) debt-related to 
obtain an optimal financial structure maximizing the value of the firm. with against the second ignores the concept 
of optimal capital structure and argues that the choice of funding is through a hierarchical order.  
However, despite the contributions of these approaches to corporate finance several decisions are not 
understood. Indeed, if we accept eg trade-off, the structures observed funding can be either without adjustment 
costs and structure with optimal ratios or goods with adjustment costs and poach the optimum ratios (Ross, 1977; 
Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Mayers and Majluf, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Stulz, 1990; Graham, 2000; Booth 
et al., 2001). Booth et al. (2001) argues the presence of a discrepancy between the theoretical predictions (STT and 
POT) analysis of the capital structure of companies and the distribution of this structure in reality. 
Many contemporary researchers have emphasized the importance of leaders values and objectives in explaining 
corporate financing structure (Barton and Gordon, 1987; Barton et al., 1989). Indeed, the individual arguments are 
shortcuts influencing cognitive stance, making irrational and suboptimal under traditional financial theories. These 
biases have been identified and classified and include the follows: The representativeness bias, analog reasoning 
conservatism bias and confirmation, but also emotions such as loss aversion, optimism and overconfidence. In this 
sense, several authors have updated the old idea that emotions an adaptive role. Emotions are necessary for the 
functioning of many of our faculties, such as memory, reasoning, decision-making. 
Goleman et al. (2001) asserts that the emotional part of our brain is the basis of development of our thinking 
and, ultimately, our lives. It is this which explains our successes and our failures. Graham (2000) says that insofar 
as our emotions or block amplify our ability to think and plan, learn to achieve a goal distant, solve problems, etc., 
they define the limits of our ability to use our innate mental abilities and therefore decide our future. 
The leader attitude, such as commitment, positively influences the ability to assess alternatives. According to 
Baker et al. (2011) to contemporary organizations, it is not enough more to recruit and retain workers but they 
must also inspire and give them the ability to deploy the most of their skills in their duties. Companies have 
therefore need people who are psychologically related to their work and their organization wishing invest more in 
their roles, in other words, today's businesses need workers engaged. 
It is therefore interesting to transpose the bias identified in behavioral finance study behavior of leaders faced 
with choices of financing and investment. This is the path taken by the current managerial optimism. Assumptions 
neglect the existence of information asymmetries and conflicts of interests between the leaders - shareholders and 
introduce behavioral biases leading executives to be engaged, optimistic or overly confident in their skills and 
future revenues firm. 
The presence of these biases we bring to the questioning of the effectiveness of decisions managerial (political 
financing) and the integration of behavioral dimension in explaining the policy of corporate finance. 
On this basis, the aim of our research is to integrate the behavioral dimension in the analysis of financing choices 
leaders: our goal is to show the effect of the managerial commitment to its choice of financing. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Individual reasoning with cognitive shortcuts that influence the position, irrational and non-optimal in terms of 
conventional financial theories making. These biases have been identified and classified and include the following 
terms: The representativeness bias, analog reasoning bias conservatism and confirmation, but also emotions such 
as loss aversion, optimism, overconfidence and emotional commitment. In this sense, many contemporary 
researchers have updated the old idea that emotions have an adaptive role. Emotions are necessary for the 
functioning of many of our faculties, such as memory, reasoning, decision-making or social adjustment. 
Research has frequently demonstrated the influence of affect on attitudes and behavior (Garg et al., 2007). 
Recent years have thus emphasized the predominant role of emotion as an enabler for decision making on the one 
hand and as one of the key regulators of behavior, on the other hand (Philippot, 2007). 
The behavioral finance literature that examines the consequences of behavioral biases of managers has 
primarily focused on managerial loss aversion, optimism and overconfidence; traits that have been shown to be 
prevalent in managers (Malmendier and Tate, 2005;2008). 
In this paper, we extend the results of our study conducted in the Tunisian context in 2012 (Azouzi and 
Jarboui, 2012).We examine an alternative explanation based on differences in managerial beliefs to shed light on 
some of the unexplained variation in capital structure decision. We examine the role of CEO behavioral 
characteristics (emotional commitment) in the design of capital structure choice. Hence, in this section, the central 
objective consists in highlighting the type of relationship existing between emotional commitment and the capital 
structure choice : the first part consists in emotional commitment construct and the second part show relationship 
between emotional commitment and the capital structure choice. 
 
2.1. Emotional Commitment Concept (EC) 
2.1.1. Definition 
Tsai (1999) defined organizational commitment as the identification with the organization and willingness to 
make extra efforts for the organization to achieve organizational goals (Lee et al., 2014).  
Robbins (2001) believed that organizational commitment is the level of loyalty to and identification with an 
organization, as well as the involvement in organizational activities (Lee et al., 2014). 
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Meyer and Allen (1991) define commitment:" as a Psychological state that characterizes the employee's relationship 
with the organization and has implications for the decision to continue or discontinuous membership in the organization 
"(Meyer and Allen, 1991). 
For these authors, if the commitment is a psychological state that reflects the relationship of employees in their 
organization, the concept now has several dimensions. Their approach built the commitment to a multidimensional 
three components: a component "emotional", a component of "continuation" and a component "normative". 
In our study, is interested in the emotional commitment component. Thus, Meyer and Allen (1991) define 
Emotional commitment:" refers to identification and emotional attachment to the company". This type of 
commitment is interested in the will of the individual to adhere to what the organization stands for. The individual 
engaged emotionally, identifies, engages and is happy to be a member of the company for which he works (Allen 
and Meyer, 1990; Meyer and Allen, 1997). 
 
2.1.2.Commitment Organizational Model: Three-Component Model of Organizational 
commitment (TCM) (Allen and Meyer, 1996) 
There are currently at least three active approaches to measuring organizational commitment: the 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire by Mowday et al. (1979) the Identification/Internalization Typology 
by O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) and the Three-Component Model of organizational commitment (TCM) by Meyer 
and Allen (1991;1997). Among these approaches, the TCM is widely regarded as the most dominant model in 
organizational commitment research (McDonald and Makin, 2000; Greenberg and Baron, 2003; Cohen, 2003;2007; 
Bentein et al., 2005; Solinger et al., 2008). 
Allen and Meyer (1990) argued that organizational commitment is a multiple construction and can be divided 
into personal emotions, costs and risks perceived and social relationships. Organizational commitments can be 
decomposed into (1) affective commitment: the level of emotional attachments toward an organization; (2) 
continued commitment: perceived costs and risks regarding the departure from the organization; and (3) normative 
commitment: a moral commitment, the responsibility and obligation felt toward the organization.These dimensions 
describe the different ways of organizational commitment development and the implications for employees‟ 
behavior. 
 
Affective Commitment 
Largely inspired by the work of Porter et al. (1974) we chose to use the measuring instrument developed by 
Allen and Meyer (1990) to measure organizational commitment emotional guy. Affective commitment involves 
three aspects: creation, emotion setting to the organization, identification and desire to maintain organizational 
membership. According to Meyer and Allen (1997) affective commitment is “the employee‟s emotional attachment 
to, identification with and involvement in the organization”. Their model target how the individual feels committed 
to the location of the employing organization, taking into account the positive feelings of identification, attachment 
and involvement.they indicate that affective commitment is influenced by factors such as employment challenge, 
the role clarity, clarity of purpose and the purpose of the difficulty, responsiveness by management, peer cohesion, 
equity, self-importance, comments, participation and reliability. 
 
2.1.3. Emotional Commitment, Academic Performance and Social Interactions 
The consequences of affective commitment on organizational behavior have a significant justification for 
interest in this concept. Essentially because it is associated with favorable outcomes such as lower turnover rates 
and increased job performance and organizational citizenship behavior (Meyer et al., 2002). Among the various 
forms of commitment that have been studied, the affective dimension, which reflects employees‟ identification and 
involvement with the organization (Meyer and Allen, 1991) has been found to be the most strongly associated with 
work outcomes (Meyer et al., 2002). 
Studies that have focused on the consequences of organizational commitment demonstrates the importance for 
public and private organizations, employees highly engaged emotionally. Meyer and Allen (1997) reported that an 
employee strongly committed emotionally present greater motivation or a greater desire to contribute significantly 
to the organization. It will work with more zeal and will have a higher return. He will direct his attention to the 
performance aspects of his work that he considers valuable to the organization. He will receive a congruence 
between its objectives and those of his organization. 
Rocha et al. (2008) say that organizational commitment not only has positive influences on organizations, but 
also beneficial to individual employee and the society as a whole. It benefits employees themselves in such a way 
that emotional and financial instability can be reduced by lower turnover rate.The achievement of in-role 
performance could be affected by employees‟ affective commitment to the organization (Swailes, 2004). Affective 
commitment is an employee‟s desire to stay as a member of the organization, an intention to make an effort for the 
organization, a belief in the values and norms of the organization (Glazer and Kruse, 2008) and emotional 
attachment to the organization. This affective commitment is a driving force that makes employees contribute to 
the improvement of the organization‟s performance (Lee et al., 2014). 
 
2.2. Hypothesis 
2.2.1. CEO'S Emotional Commitment and Internally Generated Resources Choice  
The most common approach in the literature is undoubtedly emotional commitment, which is defined as the 
identification and emotional attachment of an employee to his company (Meyer and Allen, 1997). According to the 
literature, affective commitment would encourage positive attitudes and behaviors at work. As highlighted  
individuals emotionally committed to their business would be more willing to develop favorable towards it 
attitudes and to show willing to contribute voluntarily to the proper functioning.  
Affective commitment is positively related to positive discretionary behaviors (Shore and Wayne, 1993; Organ 
and Ryan, 1995; Allen and Meyer, 1996). So any CEO engaged threatened by the risk of loss of social status 
seeking to value his work at the head of his company through effective financial choices. Helliar et al. (2005) argue 
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that the loss showers leaders seek to avoid the most pessimistic. scenarios They do not would use the management 
tools risk to reduce the variance of cash flows but rather to avoid the worst scenarios pessimistic influencing the 
risk of bankruptcy or preventing the company to benefit profitable investment to value his work at the head of his 
company through effective financial choices. It therefore avoids choice of methods of risk financing (debt: 
bankruptcy risk and equity: takeover risk ) and preferred financing internal capital. 
Somers and Birnbaum (2000) state leaders committed both to their profession and their company appear more 
positive attitudes and behaviors for the organization, including better and a lower satisfaction and greater 
involvement in work propensity to leave the organization. These highly committed leaders opt for projects riskier 
investment (including investment innovation). This investment requires the risky choice to prefer self-financing in 
order to escape the risk premium required by providers of external capital. This implies the presence of a positive 
relationship between internally generated resources preferences and CEO emotional commitment level. 
Kundi et al. (2007) Show that the CEO emotional commitment level its encourages to undertake the efficiency 
choice.A committed leader seeks to avoid the adverse consequences of financial distress (loss of brand image on the 
market leaders ...). He prefers to finance its investments by internal capital at the expense of external financing 
modes (risky). 
Girandola and Michelik (2008) assume that the leaders strongly committed tend to be more optimistic. Hilary 
and Menzly (2006) added that financial analysts in situations of overconfidence and optimism (emotional 
commitment high level) tend to move away from the consensus predictions apart by delivering the reality of more 
than 10%. The same idea, always take an engaged leader that his company is undervalued by the market. The 
leader must take into account the risk and uncertainties regarding fluctuations in stock prices and takeovers. So it 
will save the maximum to be financed by the market (capital increase).  
H1: An engaged leader accepts a internally generated resources level greater than that debt (and / or 
equity). 
 
2.2.2. CEO'S Emotional Commitment and Debt Choice  
Meyer et al. (2004) suggested that commitment level is part of the motivation. They showed that the CEO 
commitment level is positively correlated with its motivation. This committed leader (motivated) looking through 
strategic choices (including debt financing decision) report the performance of its business. Thus, modeling 
financial decisions proposed by Mayers and Majluf (1984) how show the level of debt can be used to solve the 
problem of asymmetric information between leader and markets (investors). The leader chosen for debt project 
finance and performance reports (maximizes shareholder wealth in place and refuse the entry of new shareholders) 
of the firm that pushes analysts to reassess. 
De Clercq et al. (2009) found that CEO'S Emotional commitment positively impacts start-up and venture 
performance. Thus, the committed leader opts for debt to take advantage of its tax savings (the most successful 
companies are the most indebted is the Static Trade-off Theory), create value for shareholders and to report its 
performance on the market leaders. 
Chang et al. (2009) states that managers overestimate their power to reduce risks within the business. Bertrand 
and Sendhil (2003) point out that the reputation leaders can lead them to prefer to imitate the decisions of their 
predecessors efficient, ignoring the return on investment. This mimicry appears depending on the CEO 
commitment level, age and the uncertainty of its environment. Indeed it is committed leader downpour in the 
reputation loss or employment chooses a distribution policy more generous than its predecessors dividends (Azouzi 
and Jarboui, 2012). It meets the expectations of its shareholders in terms of changes in the rate of dividend 
distribution. It uses the borrowing capacity of the company. They also underestimate bankruptcy probability and 
therefore issue a higher debt level. 
Luthans and Youssef (2007) show that organizational commitment is positively related with optimism. 
Fairchild (2009) adds that optimistic leader (high emotional commitment level) overestimates the capacity of its 
business and underestimate the costs of financial distress. This evaluation bias (hopefully) makes him choose debt 
as a financing of these investment projects. Thus, Malmendier and Tate (2005;2008); Malmendier and Tate (2015) 
find that the optimistic manager will give priority to self-financing, then debt and ultimately to the issuance of 
shares. Thus, if the flow of the company is insufficient capacity, it is useful to resort to external financing. The 
optimistic leader always prefers debt (reported by debt) to the capital increase: the Pecking Order Theory (Azouzi 
and Jarboui, 2012). 
Humphreys et al. (2005) observed a positive correlation between CEO Emotional Intelligence and commitment 
level (Carmeli, 2003; Rosete and Ciarrochi, 2005). Siu (2009) indicates the presence of a positive correlation 
between emotional intelligence and effective decision-making. The author maintains a high level of emotional 
intelligence is positively associated with low suggestibility of behavioral biases. Thus, emotion regulation refers to 
actual useful skills to cope with the necessary modifications and changes that take part in our societies (Gendron, 
2008). In other words, emotional intelligence allows the leader to generate and maintain enthusiasm, serenity 
optimism and commitment in the organization and cooperation and mutual trust. Awareness and understanding of 
others' emotions allow him to gain the confidence of all stakeholders of the company. This emotional regulation 
facilitates the negotiations of contracts with third parties, reduced transaction costs and ensures speed. These 
conditions encourage the leaders to issue risky securities (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2014). The reduction of transaction 
costs impulse CEO access to extra debt. 
H2: A leader committed accept a level of debt more than rational 
 
2.2.3. CEO'S Emotional Commitment Level and Equity Choice  
Modern organizations expect their employees to be full of enthusiasm and show initiative at work, they want 
them to take responsibility for their own development, strive for high quality and performance, be energetic and 
dedicated to what they do. In other words, companies want their employees be engaged (Bakker and Leiter, 2010). 
Other researchers state that employee engagement is the best tool in the company‟s efforts to gain competitive 
advantages and stay competitive (Rashid et al., 2011). This implies that the leader is less emotionally engaged 
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downpour in the loss. It is in the position to effectively evaluate market reactions. He is aware of the financial 
situation of the company. It is not reluctant to issue shares to finance its investment projects. 
Maslach et al. (2001) and May et al. (2004) suggested that leadership commitment affects the quality of work 
and their own experience to their work. It influences the growth and productivity of the organization. Thus, 
committed leaders‟ benefits likely to use their emotions to enhance their job performance. In other words, the 
emotional engagement allows the leader to improve its relationship with its business partners whose creditors. 
This facilitates the negotiations of contracts, reduces agency costs, transaction costs and ensures the speed of 
operations. These conditions encourage the leaders to issue risky securities (including equity preferences). 
Halov and Heider (2004) defend the general idea that a strong asymmetric information about the risk of a 
company leads to adverse selection problem that leads companies to issue equity securities. Thus, Luthans and 
Youssef (2007) show that organizational commitment is positively related with optimism. In other words, 
optimistic and committed leader underestimates the risk of its business. He believes that the risk can be reduced by 
proper use of their professional skills, which led him to choose means costly external financing (external equity). 
The increase in risk, as measured by the volatility of securities, led to an increase in share issues. These results are 
based on the assumption that differences in volatility capture differences asymmetric information about the 
variance of cash flows arising from a managerial commitment. This implies the presence of a positive relationship 
between equity preferences and CEO emotional commitment level. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) show a long-term relationship between levels of debt and capital. They confirm the 
impact of market conditions on financing choices. Parfet (2000) adds that the ability of a company to provide stable 
and predictable performance is a sign of good management. So, any CEO emotional committed seeks to show that 
good management through its financing choices. It issues shares when prices are high and go into debt or redeem 
shares when prices are low to benefit from favorable market trends. 
Faccio et al. (2001) the dividend payment is lower in East Asia, where conflicts of interest between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders are severe, because the risk of expropriation is high because of the 
existence of such structures. In other words, a leader committed emotionally to manage its conflicts of interest 
between minority and majority shareholders. It is encouraged to minimize dividend payments. The presence of a 
restrictive dividend policy limit CEO preference of external financing choices (including equity ). 
H3: the use of the capital increase is more important for leaders committed 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Data 
To note, the empirical tests are based on 100 non-financial Tunisian firms during the 2010 fiscal year (28 are 
listed companies and 82 are non-listed companies, see Table 1). All financial firms (including banks) outing to the 
fact that this business sector is regulated and likely to have fundamentally different cash flows and characteristics. 
Firms with insufficient data regarding about emotional characteristics and the board of director‟s composition are 
also excluded. The board‟s compositions, as well as financial characteristics data, are gathered from the BVMT 
annual report. 
Emotional and psychological characteristics are collected by means of an administered questionnaire. Actually, 
the selected choice deals with some homogeneous individuals representing some Tunisian CEO representatives of 
100 firms (60 males, 35 females, 5 unreported), ranging in age from 25 to 58 (Table 2).  
 
Table-1.Visited Companies 
Initial BVMT sample for 2010 50 
Financialfirms (22) 
Other non financial firms 120 
Insufficient data to CEO Emotional Commitment  (40) 
Insufficient data to board of directors compositions (8) 
Final sample 100 
 
Table-2. CEOs‟ characteristics 
 n  Percentages 
Age 
25-30 years 
31-40 years 
40-49 years 
Over 50 years 
 
5 
20 
35 
40 
 
5% 
20% 
35% 
40% 
Gender/sex 
Males 
females 
Unreported 
 
60 
35 
5 
 
60% 
35% 
5% 
Degree  
Baccalaureate 
Bac + 2 
Bac + 4 
DAS/HDSS 
 
15 
20 
30 
35 
 
15% 
20% 
30% 
35% 
 
Most questionnaires have been distributed by the method of door to door to ensure they are personally 
delivered to the person concerned; few among them have been mailed, for businesses located outside the Greater 
Tunis area. 
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It is worth noting, however, a broader sample that even if it had been envisaged to be studied and that more 
than 100 questionnaires had been distributed for this purpose, we would have received far fewer responses than 
expected (return rate 44.84 per cent: although the number of distributed questionnaires reached 223, the responses 
received did not exceeded 100 CEO). Indeed, many of the adduced have refused to respond to our questions on the 
ground of several reasons, namely, that: 
 They are too busy and have no time to devote to research; 
 they generally do not pay any interest to the questionnaires submitted by students and would return them 
to their assistants or other staff for a response (this has been the case of our officer-centred research); and 
 They perceive that the questionnaire is a sort of „„control‟‟ damage to their private lives and that it is out of 
the question to answer. 
Other encountered difficulties are mainly due to the administrative procedures and hierarchical procedures 
which linger questionnaires to the recoveries. Fortunately, the leaders who had been so kind as to cooperate and 
help us formulate and set up our sample eventually composed of 100 private company leaders, belonging mostly to 
the industrial sector. 
 
3.2. Variables’ Measurement 
The objective of this section is to determine the variables‟ measurement. 
 
3.2.1. Capital Structure Choice 
The purpose of this article is to show the impact of CEO emotional commitment on the firm capital structure 
choice (internally generated resources, debt level and choosing to issue new stocks). The appropriate measures in 
the literature to evaluate three methods of financing are Azouzi and Jarboui (2012): 
 
3.2.3.1.Internally Generated Resources (The Cash Flow) 
Research within the framework of financial theory of investment, have resorted tomany measures of internal 
resources. Cash flow represents the flow generated by the activity of any business, is one of the most 
appropriate (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Molay, 2006; Naoui et al., 2008; Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012). 
CF = Net income + Depreciation – Dividend 
Casch Flow rate (RCF) = CF / Total Assets 
To show that the leader chosen or not internaly generated ressources, we can use the change in flow rate. A 
negative change indicates the use of internal resources. 
Cash flow rate variation = RCFN- RCFN-1 / RCFN-1 
 
3.2.3.2. Debt Level 
We observe a variety of variables that measure the level of debt in the company.Measures such as total debt 
service ratio has been selected by several authors (Hovakimian et al., 2004). Others have used the debt ratio in the 
medium and long term (Myers, 2001). The debt ratio in the short term was also used by Titman (1984). 
As part of our analysis we propose to use the debt ratio as a measure of this variable. It should be noted that this 
ratio is calculated by: 
Leverage ratios (LEV)= (total debt / total assets) 
This measure is also used by Koh (2003); Demaria and Dufour (2007); Jarboui and Olivero (2008);  Benkraiem 
(2008);  Sahut and Gharbi (2008) and Azouzi and Jarboui (2012). 
To show that the manager uses debt or not, we can use the change in debt ratio. A positive change indicates the 
use of debt. 
Leverage ratios variation = LEVN- LEVN-1 / LEVN-1 
 
3.2.3.3. Equity level 
This variable is measured by the value of equity in the balance sheet of the company.To show that the 
leader chosen or not the capital increase, we can use the variationin the percentage of investment. A positive 
change indicates an increase of capital (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012). 
Level of Capital Invested (LCI) = equity / total assets 
Level of Capital Invested Variation = LCIN- LCIN-1 / LCIN-1 
The financial decision takes 7 follows: 
 1 if the manager chooses the internally generated resources: positive variation in the cash flow rate. 
 2 if the manager chooses debt: positive variation in the leverage ratio. 
 3 if the manager chooses the capital increase: positive variation in the level of invested capital. 
 4 if the manager chooses internally generated resources + debt : positive variation in the cash flow rate 
and debt ratios. 
 5 if the manager chooses internally generated resources + capital increase: positive variation in the cash 
flow rate and level of capita invested. 
 6 if the manager chooses debt + capital increase: positive variation in the leverage ratio and level of 
invested capital. 
 7 if the manager chooses internally generated resources + debt+ capital increase: positive variation in the 
cash flow rate, leverage ratio and level of invested capital. 
 
3.2.2. Emotional Commitment 
To measure the CEO‟s commitment bias, we take the same steps as most of studies have using an adaptation of 
the original questionnaire elaborated by Meyer and Allen (1991) to evaluate organizational commitment 
(Organizational Commitment Scale). This instrument is chosen because of its validity and its multidimensional 
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character shown by several researchers (Meyer et al., 2002; Azouzi and Jarboui, 2013). The questionnaire includes 
statements such as: "I do not feel a full member of the company "and" I'll be very happy to finish my career in this 
business. 
The commitment bias takes the following two points (Table 3): 
• 1 if the manager has a high level of this bias. 
•0 if not 
 
Table-3. Items used in the Emotionnal Commitment scale (8 Items) 
Items Emotional Commitment  50.750 % of total variance 
1. I would be very happy to finish my career in my company 0.861 
2. I like to discuss my firm with outsiders.  0.851 
3. I feel the problems of my company like mine. 0.842 
4. I think I could easily become attached to other 
organizations such as my firm 
-0.774 
5. I do not feel a full member of my firm 0.715 
6.I do not feel emotionally attached to my company 0.553 
7.My firm at great personal meaning for me. 0.466 
8. Do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my firm 0.677 
 
3.2.3. Profitability 
More profitable firms have, ceteris paribus, more internally generated resources to fund new investments. If 
their managers follow a pecking order, they will be less likely to seek external financing (Fama and French, 2002). 
Thus, on average, these firms‟ leverage ratios will be lower. In trade-off models, on the other hand, this 
relationship is inverted. More profitable firms are less subject to bankruptcy risks. Hence, their expected 
bankruptcy costs are reduced and they can make more use of the tax shields provided by debt, thus choosing a 
position of greater leverage. We will keep the ratio of return on assets ROA to measure this variable (Azouzi and 
Jarboui, 2012;2014): 
ROA= Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation divided by total assets, lagged one year period 
 
3.2.4. Firm Size  
Studies suggest that the probability of bankruptcy is lower in larger firms and that, therefore, their debt 
capacity is higher than that of smaller ones, all else equal. On the other hand, fixed transaction costs can make new 
stock issues unattractive to small corporations, stimulating them to issue debt Rajan and Zingales (1998); 
Hovakimian et al. (2004); Azouzi and Jarboui (2012;2014). Indeed, most studies have applied total assets or 
turnover as a measure for firm size (Bujadi and Richardson, 1997). In this paper, it is measured through the log 
of the firm’s total assets (LNSIZE).  
 
3.2.5. Control Variable  
3.2.5.1. Future Investment Opportunities 
It is argued that future profitable investment opportunities can influence corporate financing decisions in 
different ways. In the context of the pecking order theory, firms that have many investment opportunities and 
believe that their stocks (and risky bonds) are undervalued by the market, may choose a capital structure with less 
debt. If they maintained high debt ratios, they would be forced to distribute precious cash flows generated by their 
business and could face the need to issue undervalued securities to fund new projects. This could, in turn, induce 
underinvestment. A more static version of the pecking order model, on the other hand, predicts that firms with 
more future opportunities will be more levered, ceteris paribus, because they need more external financing and 
issuing debt is preferable to issuing new stock (Graham, 2000; Booth et al., 2001; Naoui et al., 2008; Azouzi and 
Jarboui, 2012;2014). 
We will keep the Tobin‟s Q to measure this variable. The Tobin‟s Q Estimated with the approximation formula 
proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994): 
it it
it
it
MVS  D  
Q
A


 
MVS – market value of common and preferred shares; D – book value of debt, defined as current liabilities plus 
long-term debt plus inventories minus current assets; A – total assets. 
 
3.2.5.2. Board of Directors  
To note, theories regarding the board of directors, along with prior empirical researches and various 
recommendations have suggested that some board characteristics have an influence on the quality of the financial 
report and on firms‟ performance. Board characteristics are examined here:, independence (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The board‟s independence 
The different characteristics pertaining to the board‟s independence are measured by the following variable: 
BIND is defined as the percentage of the board members who are simultaneously independent and non-executives 
which is equal to the number of outside directors divided by the total board members (Forker, 1992; Wright, 1996; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2000; Chtourou et al., 2001; Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012). 
BIND = number of outside directors /total board members. 
Table 4 presents the characteristics of boards of directors of the 100 Tunisian companies included in our study. 
Tunisian companies are run by independent boards, medium (seven directors) and not dominated by CEOs. 
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Table-4. Board of Directors‟ Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std Min Max N 
Entire Board 7.60 2.56 4 12 100 
Outside Directors 2.62 1.11 1 4 100 
Affiliated Directors 1.98 0.80 1 3 100 
Inside Directors 3.360 1.34 1 5 100 
CEO Duality  0.26 0.44 0 1 100 
 
For simplification purposes, the summary of each variable extent range in the model, its name as well as its 
expected impact on the firm assets specificity choice are depicted in Table 5. 
 
Table-5. Operational definitions of variables 
Class : Phenomena : Mesure : Variables : Predictions : 
Endogens variables : 
 
Capital 
structure 
choice 
Internally generated 
resources (The Cash Flow) 
 
CF = Net 
income + Depreciation – 
Dividend 
Casch Flow rate (RCF) 
= CF / Total Assets 
) 
Cash flow rate variation 
= RCFN- RCFN-1 / RCFN-1 
 
CF 
Debt level Leverage ratios (LEV)= 
(total debt / total assets) 
Leverage ratios variation 
= LEVN- LEVN-1 / LEVN-1 
LEV 
 
Equity level Level of Capital Invested 
(LCI) = equity / total assets 
Level of Capital Invested 
Variation = LCIN- LCIN-1 
/ LCIN-1 
EQ 
Exogenous variables : 
 CF LEV EQ 
Emotionnal 
Commitment 
CEO identification 
with and involvement in a  
particular organization 
The questionnaire obtained 
score 
EC + + + 
Profitability 
 
Reports on the company's 
ability to meet its 
commitments 
ROA= Earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation divided by 
total assets, lagged one year 
period 
 
PF + + - 
Firm size Firms signaled performance Ln (total assets) LNSIZE + + + 
Controls variables: 
Future 
investment 
opportunities 
Indicates the productive 
capacity of the company it it
it
it
MVS  D  
Q
A


 
MVS – market value of 
common and preferred shares; 
D – book value of debt, defined 
as current liabilities plus long-
term debt plus inventories 
minus current assets; A – total 
assets. 
FIO - + + 
Board of 
Directors 
The presence of 
independent 
members in the 
board 
Number of outside 
directors /total board 
members. 
 
BIND 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
3.3. Decision Tree Methods 
A Decision tree is a flowchart-like tree structure where each internal node (non-leaf node) denotes a test on an 
attribute, each branch represents an outcome of the test and each leaf node (terminal node) holds a class label. The 
topmost node in a tree is the root node. 
A decision tree is a decision-making device which assigns a probability to each of the possible choices based on 
the context of the decision: P (f / h), where f is an element of the future attributes (the set of choices) and h is a 
history (the context of the decision). This probability P(f / h) is determined by asking a sequence of questions ql q2 
... qn about the context, where the ith question asked is uniquely determined by the answers to the i - 1 previous 
questions. Each question asked by the decision tree is represented by a tree node and the possible answers to this 
question are associated with branches emanating from the node. Each node defines a probability distribution on the 
space of possible decisions. A node at which the decision tree stops asking questions is a leaf node. The leaf nodes 
represent the unique states in the decision-making problem, i.e. all contexts which lead to the same leaf node have 
the same probability distribution for the decision (Michae, 2006). Classification is a data mining technique that 
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assigns items in a group to target class. The purpose of classification is to accurately envisage the target class for 
each case in the data. In our study we used the naive Bayesian classification to explain CEO investment choice. The 
Naive Bays classifier is a simple probabilistic classifier based on applying Bays Theorem with strong independence 
assumptions which assumes all of the features are equally independent. It uses a Bayesian algorithm for the total 
probability procedure, the principle is according to the probability that the text belongs to a category of prior 
probability, and the text would be assigned to the category of posterior probability. In simple terms, a naive Bays 
classifier assumes that the presence (or absence) of a particular feature of a class is unrelated to the presence (or 
absence) of any other feature. 
 
3.4. Deﬁne Attributes and Values 
The first step in building a decision tree is to list the variables recursively, starting from the target variable to 
the causes. In this order we present the variables in the table below: 
 
Table-6.The attributes and their values 
Attributes Type 
Capital structure choice Discret [1 ; 2 ;3 ] 
Emotionnal Commitment Discret : YES/NO 
Profitability 
 
Discret : YES/NO 
Firm size Discret [1 ; 2 ; 3] 
Future investment opportunities Discret : YES/NO 
Board Independence Discret : YES/NO 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Graphical Model Analysis 
Capital Structure Choice Modality: [1.2.3.4.5.6.7] 
 
 
1.Internally Generated Resources 
2.Debt  
3.Equity 
4.Internally Generated Resources+ Debt 
5. Internally Generated Resources +Equity 
6.Debt+Equity 
7. Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity 
 
 
Table-7. Attribute Statistic 
Attribute  Probability % 
Capital structure choice (CSC)  100 
Internally Generated Resources 10 
Debt 9 
Equity 10 
Internally Generated Resources+ Debt 14 
Internally Generated Resources +Equity 18 
Debt + Equity 48 
Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity 21 
Emotional commitment (EC) 100 
Yes :1 55 
No : 0 45 
Profitability (PROF) 100 
Yes :1 54 
No : 0 46 
Firm size (FSIZE) 100 
Small :1 66 
Medium : 2 26 
Big :3 8 
Future investment opportunities (FIO) 100 
Yes :1 85 
No : 0 15 
Board independency (BIND) 100 
Yes :1 69 
No : 0 31 
Note that the decision tree that has been built gives us information on the relevance of attributes about the 
target variable (firm capital structure choice): 
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The graphical model shows that the size is "is the first variable used; is called segmentation variable. This is 
the most relevant in the analysis of CEO capital structure preferences(P =0.21 for the choice of capital structure 
mode: Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity). As it is composed of three terms {small, medium, large}, so 
she produced three peaks children.  The first edge (the first leg), left, on the second level, is produced from the 
"average" category of the variable "size". The resulting top cover 2 observation. It indicates the Future investment 
opportunities (FIO) {Yes / No}. The frequency distribution shows that for a leader to medium size firm and 
Future investment opportunities chosen capital structure mode 7 namely Internally Generated Resources+ 
Debt+Equity a probability of 21.2%. The second ridge in the center corresponds to the "large" category of the 
segmentation variable "size"; the corresponding vertex cover 2 observation. It shows the profitability level of the 
company {Yes/ No}. The frequency distribution shows that for a large company is performing selected one of the 
capital structure terms are: Internally Generated Resources with a probability of 25%.  
The third ridge, right, is the "small" category of the segmentation variable "size"; the corresponding vertex 
cover 2 observation. It indicates the degree of independence of the board {Yes / No}. The frequency distribution 
shows that, for the Tunisian small businesses that their advice is independent, leaders prefer a combination of 
Internally Generated Resources+ Debt with a probability of 23.3%.  
Let the third level of the tree to the left, we see that the variable future investment opportunities (FIO)turns 
into a segmentation variable. As it is composed of two modality {Yes / No}, we note the presence of two branches. 
Thus, the first edge on the left, on the third level, is produced from the "no" category of the variable " Future 
investment opportunities ". The resulting top cover 2 observation. It indicates the level of CEO emotional 
commitment {Yes/ No}. The frequency distribution shows that the CEO prefer Internally Generated Resources+ 
Debt+Equity with a probability of 26.7% due to their emotional commitment. The second part is produced from 
the modality "yes" to the variable "  Future investment opportunities ". The resulting top cover 2 observation. It 
indicates the level of CEO emotional commitment {Yes / No}. The frequency distribution shows that the engaged 
prefer Internally Generated Resources +Equity with a probability of 29.%.  
Still remain on the third level to the right of the tree, there is the variable of board independence as 
segmentation variable. As it is composed of two modality {yes / no}, we note the presence of two branches. Thus, 
the first edge on the left, on the third level, is produced from the modality "yes" to the variable "independent 
counsel." The resulting top cover 2 observation. It indicates the firm profitability level {Yes / No}. The frequency 
distribution shows that the leaders of profitable firm with independent advice and choose the Internally Generated 
Resources+ Debt with a probability of 25%. The second part is produced from the "no" category of the variable 
"independent board." The resulting top cover 2 observation. It indicates the level of profitability of the company 
{Yes/ No}. The frequency distribution shows the least profitable companies that their advice is independent opting 
Internally Generated Resources +Equity to probability 28.6%. This process is repeated on each vertex of the tree 
until pure leaves. Thus, the pure or pure tree leaf in our study corresponds to level 5. The right part of level 5 
shows that companies, profitable firm, small size and independent advice to choose the Debt and combination 
between debt+ equity with the following probabilities: 33.33% and 66.7% due to their leaders‟ emotional 
commitment high level. We also note that Tunisian companies small, less profitability level and independent 
incentive leader to undertake Internally Generated Resources+ Debt to probability 50%. Tunisian companies 
small, independency small level, profitable have emotionally committed leader. This emotional bias incited him to 
prefer Internally Generated Resources+ Debt and Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity with the 
following probabilities: 50% and 40%. Tunisian companies small, independency small level, profitability small level 
prefer Internally Generated Resources +Equity and Equity with the following probabilities: 50% and 66.7%. 
Let the left of the pure tree parts, the results of our classification argue that Tunisian emotionally engaged 
leaders in medium size firm, profitable, future investment opportunities and independent opt for Internally 
Generated Resources +Equity with a probability of 33.33%. They use Debt + Equity with a probability of 33.33% if 
the profitability of their firms is low. Then these engaged leaders realize the Equity with a probability of 40% when 
the level of board independence and corporate future investment opportunities levels are low. However, companies 
use Debt with a probability of 40%. This choice is justified by the low level of emotionally engaged leaders despite 
high profitability of these firms.  
 
4.2. Cross Validation Analysis 
For measuring performance classification techniques the following parameters are taken. In Classification 
techniques parameters to be examined are accuracy, sensitivity, precision, specificity and f-measure. 
 
Classification Accuracy 
Accuracy is the percent of correct classifications. Accuracy is the overall correctness of the model and is 
calculated as the sum of correct classifications divided by the total number of classifications. We note that this ratio 
is low for 7 classes of capital structure choice (13%). 
 
Sensitivity 
Sensitivity is a measure of the ability of a prediction model to select instances of a certain class from a data set. 
It is corresponds to the true positive rate. We note that the capital structure preferences of Tunisian companies are 
divided into the following 4 conditions:  
 Internally Generated Resources with a completion rate of 30% 
 Internally Generated Resources +Equity with a completion rate of 22.22% 
 Debt+ Equity with a completion rate of 5.56% and  
 Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity with a completion rate of 23.81% 
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Table-8. Cross Validation analysis (CSC). 
Internally Generated Resources 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.3000 0.8333 0.2143 0.1667 0.1041 
Debt 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.0000 0.9670 N/A 0.0000 -0.0553 
Equity 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.0000 0.9222 N/A 0.0000 -0.0915 
Internally Generated Resources+ Debt 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.0000 0.8488 N/A 0.0000 -0.1560 
Internally Generated Resources +Equity 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.2222 0.7561 0.1905 0.1667 -0.0195 
Debt+ Equity 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.0556 0.8780 0.0690 0.0909 -0.0815 
Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity 
Methods  Classification 
accuracy 
Sensitivity  specificity F- mesure Precision  Matthews correlation 
coefficient 
Naive Bayes 0.1300 0.2381 0.87595 0.2222 0.2083 -0.0023 
 
Specificity 
Specificity measures the proportion of negatives who are correctly identified (e.g. the percentage of well people 
who are identified as not having the condition). In our study the specificity measures the percentage of companies 
that have not chosen the capital structure mode. we note that this percentage between 70% and 90%. This is 
explained by the Tunisian leaders made that are not aware of the presence of these combination. 
 
F- Mesure 
It corresponds to the margin of error around the exact solution. we note that the capital structure preferences 
of Tunisian companies are divided into the following 4 conditions with a low margin of error between 0.06 and 
0.22:  
 Internally Generated Resources with an error rate of 21.43% 
 Internally Generated Resources +Equity with an error rate of 19.05% 
 Debt+ Equity with an error rate of 6.90% and  
 Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity with an error rate of 22.22% 
We note that all the variables chosen for the analysis of CEO capital structure preferences (firm size, CEO 
emotional commitment, the investment opportunities, profitability and the board independence) explain that the 
following 4 capital structure choice categories namely: 
Internally Generated Resources: This result affirms our theoretical prediction (H1): An engaged leader 
accepts a internally generated resources level greater than that debt (and / or equity): A committed leader 
seeks to avoid the adverse consequences of financial distress (loss of brand image on the market leaders ...). He 
prefers to finance its investments by internal capital at the expense of external financing modes (risky).  
Internally Generated Resources +Equity: This result confirms our hypothesis (H3): organizational 
commitment is positively related with optimism. In other words, optimistic and committed leader underestimates 
the risk of its business. He believes that the risk can be reduced by proper use of their professional skills, which led 
him to choose means costly external financing (external equity). The increase in risk, as measured by the volatility 
of securities, led to an increase in share issues. These results are based on the assumption that differences in 
volatility capture differences asymmetric information about the variance of cash flows arising from a managerial 
commitment. 
Debt+ Equity This result confirms our hypothesis (H2): organizational commitment is positively related with 
optimism. Fairchild (2009) adds that optimistic leader (high emotional commitment level) overestimates the 
capacity of its business and underestimate the costs of financial distress. This evaluation bias (hopefully) makes him 
choose debt as a financing of these investment projects. Thus, Malmendier and Tate (2005;2008); Malmendier and 
Tate (2015) find that the optimistic manager will give priority to self-financing, then debt and ultimately to the 
issuance of shares. Thus, if the flow of the company is insufficient capacity, it is useful to resort to external 
financing. The optimistic leader always prefers debt (reported by debt) to the capital increase: the Pecking Order 
Theory (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012). 
Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity: This result confirms the Pecking Order Theory: optimistic 
and committed leader underestimates the risk of its business. He believes that the risk can be reduced by proper use 
of their professional skills, which led him to choose means costly external financing (external equity). The increase 
in risk, as measured by the volatility of securities, led to an increase in share issues. These results are based on the 
assumption that differences in volatility capture differences asymmetric information about the variance of cash 
flows arising from a managerial commitment. Thus, Malmendier and Tate (2005;2008); Malmendier and Tate 
(2015) find that the optimistic manager will give priority to self-financing, then debt and ultimately to the issuance 
of shares. 
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5. Conclusion 
This research examines the determinants of firms 'capital structure choice introducing a behavioral perspective. 
Theoretical analysis presented implications of managerial emotional commitment to explain his preference for 
financial decision. internally generated resources analysis by introducing managerial affective commitment 
enriched organizational financial theory: Affective commitment is positively related to positive discretionary 
behaviors. So any CEO engaged threatened by the risk of loss of social status seeking to value his work at the head 
of his company through effective financial choices. He prefers to finance its investments by internal capital at the 
expense of external financing modes (risky).  
The managerial commitment analysis of debt preference suggested that commitment level is part of the 
motivation. They showed that the CEO commitment level is positively correlated with its motivation.This 
committed leader (motivated) looking through strategic choices (including debt financing decision) report the 
performance of its business. The leader chosen for debt project finance and performance reports (maximizes 
shareholder wealth in place and refuse the entry of new shareholders) of the firm that pushes analysts to reassess. 
The relationship between firm equity choice and CEO affective commitment show that optimistic and 
committed leader underestimates the risk of its business. He believes that the risk can be reduced by proper use of 
their professional skills, which led him to choose means costly external financing (external equity). The increase in 
risk, as measured by the volatility of securities, led to an increase in share issues. These results are based on the 
assumption that differences in volatility capture differences asymmetric information about the variance of cash 
flows arising from a managerial commitment. 
Empirical analysis presenting survey CEO large private companies in Tunisia. Data analyses revealed CEO 
emotional commitment level importance in explaining his financial decision. the decision tree analysis of the 
relationship between CEO affective commitment level and investment policy confirm theoretical prediction. Thus, 
decision tree cross validation analysis suggested that financial preferences of Tunisian companies are divided into 
the following 4 conditions with a low margin of error between 0.06 and 0.22:  
 Internally Generated Resources with an error rate of 21.43% 
 Internally Generated Resources +Equity with an error rate of 19.05% 
 Debt+ Equity with an error rate of 6.90% and  
 Internally Generated Resources+ Debt+Equity with an error rate of 22.22% 
Finally, this paper proposes a decision tree model for specifying the importance of CEO commitment level 
causing financial decision analysis. Thus, decision tree model postulate that psychological dimension introduced in 
the capital structure analysis has enriched the Pecking Order Theory (POT) and the Static Trade Off Theory 
(STT) (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Heaton, 2002; Lin et al., 2008; Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012). 
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